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tion of some $500,000 was such a circumstance as demanded in-
vestigation; but in any event this circumstance can not be con-
sidered apart from the fact that twenty assurances by the auditor
had antedated it. And this circumstance has no bearing on the
question of the auditors' responsibility for earlier payments.
It is believed that the treatment of such cases as this as sound-
ing in tort for negligent injury is to be explained in part as a
survival from the ancient misfeasance cases and in part as mere
"mechanical jurisprudence". He who contracts to render Serv-
ices is bound to exercise the care and skill of the ordinary pru-
dent member of his profession or calling. This looks like "the
care of the reasonably prudent man under the circumstances"
and such it probably is. But the use of this label has led to the
application in many of these cases of the familiar doctrine of con-
tributory negligence, and this is undesirable. "Due care", to most
minds, lay and legal, carries the concept of active vigilance. This
should not be required of the plaintiff contractee. That "objec-
tive good faith"-the rule here contended for-is in the light of
careful analysis really "due care under the circumstances", is no
excuse for submitting to the jury, without more, the question of
the contractee's contributory negligence.2-  The jury need the
guidance of a rule of more definite content-a rule that will em-
phasize and take into kccount, as did the ancient misfeasance
actions, the misleading behavior of the contractor.
THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS AND PLEADING
Perhaps a single regret may accompany the passing of com-
mon law pleading :-that there also passed the "special pleader".
This type of lawyer has always been reputed to possess great
ability. At least he had a keen interest in and enthusiasm for the
study of pleading. Now we are met with the seeming paradox
that often the abler the lawyer, the less enthusiasm he has for
pleading problems. An excellent example of this is to be found
in the attitude of the New York Court of Appeals towards code
24". .. the featureless generality, that the defendant was bound to
use such care as a prudent man would do under the circumstances, ought
to be continually giving place to the specific one, that he was bound to
use this or that precaution under these or those circumstances. The stand-
ard which the defendant was bound to come up to was a standard of
specific acts or omissions, with reference to the specific circumstance in
which he found himself. If in the whole department of unintentional
wrongs, the courts arrived at no further utterance than the question of
negligence, and left every case, without rudder or compass, to the jury,
they would simply confess their inability to state a very large part of the
law which they required the defendant to know, and would assert, by im-
plication, that nothing could be learned by experience." Holmes, The Com-
-nn Law (1881) ill.
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pleading. That court has always ranked as one of the ablest
tribunals in the country, and the reputation of its present per-
sonnel is justly as high as at any time in its history. Yet clearly
the court has no consistent theory of the function of pleading in
the modern judicial system. Its early hostility to the infant code
is well known. Thereafter more liberal views intermittently pre-
vailed. But in comparatively recent years there has been a retro-
gression to ancient technicalities, particularly in the attempted
resurrection of distinctions between law and equity., Neverthe-
less, the passage in 1920 by the legislature of the Civil Practice
Act and the attempt of the court to give effect to the more liberal
provisions as to joinder of parties in that Act led again to a broad-
ening of some of the pleading concepts held by the court, notably
that of the cause of action. 2 Now in its latest pronouncement
there has again been a most violent reaction towards the past.
In Ader v. Blau (1925) 241 N. Y. 11, the plaintiff, suing
to recover damages for the death of his intestate, a young
boy, set up two counts: in one, charging that the first
defendant had negligently maintained an iron picket fence,
upon which the intestate had been injured in a manner causing
infection and death; and, in the other, alleging that the intestate,
being injured by a picket fence, came to the second defendant as
a physician and surgeon for treatment And was so negligently
treated by the latter that solely by reason thereof he died. The
court held, Cardozo, J., dissenting, that the joinder was im-
proper.2
It will be seen that the situation was the not unusual one where
the plaintiff was in doubt as to just what the proof at the trial
would disclose. He felt that he had a possible claim against
either or both of the defendants and he desired to lay the whole
case before the court and let it decide. Why is this not socially
desirable? Instead of two cases with much of the testimony
identical there is only one, and the time of courts, of litigants, and
of the witnesses-a most meritorious but little considered class--
is saved. The court, however, does not approach the case from
this angle. It begins its discussion by saying that if the joinder
is permissible, "a step has been taken away from prior rules of
practice and procedure which will be regarded as a long and
I See Clark, The Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 1;
COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 707.
2 See Cleveland Cliffs Iron Works v. Keusch (1923) 237 N. Y. 533, 143
N. E. 731; and discussion in Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33
YALE LAW JoURNAL, 817. Cf. Sherlock v. Manwaren (1924, 4th Dept.)
208 App. Div. 538, 203 N. Y. Supp. '709. For the joinder of 193 plaintiffs
who claimed to have been deceived by the same false prospectus of stock,
see Akely v. Kinnicutt (1924) 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682, and COMMENTS
(1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 192.
3 Reversing Ader v. Blau (1925, 2d Dept.) 211 App. Div. 532, 209 N. Y.
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conspicuous one, even in these times when the desire for pro-
cedural reform and improvement has become strong, widespread
and fruitful." After this illuminating disclosure of its emo-
tional reaction to new pleading situations it continues: "Of
course, we ought not to be led into taking it even under the al-
luring desire for progress and improvement if it is forbidden by
controlling rules and statutory provisions." It is submitted that
there are no such controlling rules and provisions.
Apparently the court's difficulty came from the fact that the
legislature, in adopting the liberal English rules as to joinder of
parties in the Civil Practice Act of 1920, failed to remove the old
shackles as to joinder of causes of action.- Thus persons may be
joined as plaintiffs where "if such persons brought separate
actions any common question of law or fact would arise"; 0 per-
sons may be joined as defendants "against whom the right to any
relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the al-
ternative"; and further, a plaintiff in doubt as to the persons
from whom he is entitled to redress, may join two or more, "to
the intent that the question as to which, if any, of the defendants
is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between the
parties".7 But causes of action, in order to be joined, must still
be "consistent with each other" and must fall within one of the
arbitrary classes of the statute, including the famous one of
"claims arising out of the same transaction or transactions con-
nected with the same subject of action"." The modern tendency
is to do away with those ambiguous restrictions.0 Yet a liberal
interpretation of them, viewing them, and in fact the entire sub-
ject of pleading, from the functional standpoint, would mahe of
them usable concepts. The court had previously given occasion
Supp. 784 (two justices dissenting), which in turn had reversed the Special
Term.
4 The opportunity thus afforded for confusion was discussed in Com-
x-TTs (1923) 32 YAmx LAW JOURNAL, 384.
N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 209.
N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 211; continuing that "judgment may be given
against such one or more of the defendants as may be found to be liable,
according to their respective liabilities." Sec. 212 states that it is not nec-
essary that "each defendant shall be interested as to all the relief prayed
for, or as to every cause of action included in any proceeding against him."
For joinder of parties alternately responsible, see (1924) 33 YALu LAW
JoURNAL, 328, (1925) 35 YAL LAw JOURNAL, 113.
7 N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 213. The court says: "It is not claimed that
section 213 covers this action." One may be permitted to wonder why.
Was it because of the mere form of the complaint? See discussion of the
form of the complaint, infra.
s N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, sec. 258. Many codes do not contain the express
requirement of consistency.
9 In England and in some of the states restrictions on joinder of causes
have been substantially removed. COMMENTS (1923) 32 YA=n LAw Joun-
NAL, 384; Sunderland, Joinder of Actions (1920) 18 Mxcn. L. Ruv. 571.
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to hope that such was its point of view.20 That hope is shattered
by the present case. Here the court holds (a) -inferentially-
that there are more than one cause of action, (b) that the causes
are inconsistent, (c) that they do not arise out of the same trans-
action or transactions connected with the same subject of action,
(d) that-probably-the common question of law or fact test does
not apply to the joinder of defendants," (e) that there is no such
common question here, and (f) that the defendants are not re-
sponsible "jointly, severally, or in the alternative". With each
one of these conclusions the writer disagrees.1 2
How should the somewhat vague provisions of the original code
be interpreted? The answer should be made only after the func-
tion of pleading in the trial of a case is determined. The com-
mon law writ system was, as is well known, really a corollary, or
perhaps an embodiment, of the substantive law of the time.
There was no right without a writ. The pleadings, therefore,
worked out in advance of the trial the law of the case. If the
plaintiff's lawyer misinterpreted the law, that was the plaintiff's
misfortune. The plaintiff was expected to foresee the form in
which the testimony at the trial would develop, to know tho ap-
plicable law, and to act accordingly. The procedural reform of
the nineteenth century was a reaction against this harsh system.
For it was substituted the pleading of the facts. No longer was
the plaintiff required to give the exact legal label applicable to
his case; he was only expected to give, in advance of the trial, his
20 See supra note 2.
11 This suggestion is contrary to the view ably expressed by Crouch, J.,
in Sherlocki v. Manwaren, supra, note 2, and seems contrary to the English
experience, where the extension of the privilege of joining plaintiffs has
resulted in the decisions in a like extension as to defendants. See Payno v.
British Time Recorder Co. [1921, C. A.] 2 K. B. 1; Eng. Ann. Prac. 1924,
224-226; COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 384, 386. But see
(1924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 681. It is true that the test is expressly stated
only in the section on joinder of plaintiffs. But the joinder of defendants
is stated substantially without restriction (N. Y. C. P. A., 1921, see. 211) ;
and hence if the test does not apply, surely a broader, rather than a nar-
rower rule, as intimated by the court, must apply. But the absence of a
stated restriction would render applicable the general theory of trial conven-
ience as the controlling test. This principle comes from the equity rules
of joinder which were adopted generally by the codifiers. Trial conven-
ience would largely turn on such points as whether the testimony of the
witnesses against each defendant separately would overlap; and hence, in
substance, we are back to our "common question of law or fact" test, proba-
bly as good a statement of the rule as we can make. Furthermore, the
defendants must of necessity be those who claim adversely to the plaintiffs
and, as the English experience shows, it seems impossible to determine one
set of parties without recourse to the methods of determining the other
set.
12In the limited space here available an extended discussion of each point
is not possible. It is believed, however, that the writer's position has been
made clear in the articles cited supra.
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best idea of how the past happenings which brought him into
court had occurred. After the trial had definitely established the
facts, the court was to give the proper legal judgment. Further-
more, pleading was to be relegated to the position of an aid to
the administration of justice, instead of being an end in itself.
And hence we have our modern conception of the function of
pleading, with particular emphasis upon its effect on the efficient
conduct of court business.
The change in attitude towards joinder of parties illustrates
this trend. At common law, joinder was only permissible where
the substantive right was viewed as joint, as in the case of joint
obligations or joint torts. Joinder as a purely procedural de-
vice to act as a short-cut in litigation was not contemplated at
common law. It came in, however, from the equity procedure
with the adoption of code pleading; and it is now being ex-
tended, as witness the Civil Practice Act. Hence it seems curi-
ous in the present case to find the court going back to the old
rules determining what are joint torts and who are joint tort
feasors to justify its decision.13
If then this functional aspect of pleading is considered, the pur-
pose of the pleadings is no longer to notify the court of the legal
labels involved but to give fair notice of the facts considered as
the ground of suit, and of as many facts as may be efficiently liti-
gated as a single suit. In the principal case we have the ques-
tion, how many causes of action are there presented? The court
thinks of the legal labels to be applied in deciding the case and
says, two, one for the 'negligence or 2nisance of the owner, one for
the malpractice of the physician.14 Yet the non-legal witnesses
are not going to divide up their testimony along those lines.
They are there to tell what they know concerning the facts lead-
ing to the death of the child. This is the gro:id or occasion of
the suit, and hence, in the practical and lay sense, is the cause of
action. Since pleading is to give a foretaste of the facts which
in turn come from lay witnesses, and since it is the shortening of
trials, rather than instruction of the court in the process of legal
labelling which the pleadings are designed to assist, the latter is
the proper content for the phrase in this connection. 5
Similar principles apply to the other terms considered in the
opinion. The court, thinking of the different rights of action
against each defendant, holds there is no common question of law
13 Cf. (1925) 34 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 335. The discussion was made in
connection with the holding that inconsistent causes of action were stated.
14 These express labels are used by the dissenting justices below. Sea
supra note 3.
'r See Clark, loc. cit. supra note 2. Professor McCaskill, however, be-
lieves that a more legalistic definition should be given to the concept catiSO
of action; he, too, favors the lay definition of transaction and traiactiong
connected with the same szubject of action. McCaskill, Action3 end
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and fact; and yet the practical reason for the form in which the
suit is brought is that the plaintiff is not sure who caused the
death of the child. Likewise the court holds that there is more
than one (legal) transaction, and more than one subject of the
action, to wit, the separate negligence of each defendant. It is
true that this legalistic, rather than lay or practical definition,
was the one made in certain early New York cases; but these have
been so far neglected in the later cases that their resurrection is
unexpected; and they have been definitely repudiated by other
courts and in other codes.-0 And finally the same explanation
holds of the big bugaboo to the court in the case, the requirement
of consistent causes of action. Here is no necessary inconsis-
tency in the facts as the lay witnesses will tell them; there is only
an inconsistency of legal theories. 7  Proof of the facts constitut-
ing one of the counts will not necessarily show that the other is
not true (unless perchance the case is made to turn wholly on the
use of the word "solely" in the second count) .1 This is the only
true basis of inconsistency, as the courts have come to see, not
only in connection with inconsistent causes of action,", but also
with inconsistent defenses, where the experience has been ex-
tensive and decisive.20  Moreover, under the new provisions the
Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 614. See also COMMENTS
(1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 879.
16 See complete discussion by McCaskill, op. cit. supra note 15, at 643,
648; COMMENTS (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 862. Compare, e. g., Keep
v. Kaufmcn (1874) 56 N. Y. 332, with the cases in note 2, supra. See also
Payne v. N. Y. S. & W. R. R. (1911) 201 N. Y. 436, 95 N. E. 19; France
& Canada Steamship Co. v. Berwind (1920) 229 N. Y. 89, 127 N. V. 893.
For code provisions contrary to the principal case, see Conn. Prac. Bk.
1922, secs. 172, 187, at 282, 286; Craft Refrigerating Co. v. Quinnipiac
Brewing Co. (1893) 63 Conn. 551, 29 Atl. 76; Sheen's N. J. Prac. Act,
1916, sec. 307, 222. Compare also Harris v. Avery (1869) 5 Kan. 146;
Scarborough v. Smith (1877) 18 Kan. 399; McArthur v. Moffett (1910)
143 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445; Scott v. Waggoner (1914) 48 Mont. 536, 139
Pac. 454; Shaffer v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. (1923) 300 Mo. 477, 254 S.
W. 257; Van Meter v. Goldfarb (1925, Ill.) 148 N. E. 391.
17 The court does not cite authority on this point; it says, "It seems too
clear for debate that such contradictory and repugnant theories cannot
be consistent and that plaintiff at this point fails to sustain his complaint."
18 The form of the complaint is discussed, infra.
19 Cardozo, J., dissenting, properly says: " the two causes of action are,
therefore, not inconsistent, since proof of the one will not exclude the
other, but both may coexist" See France & Canada S. S. Co. 'v. Berwind,
supra note 16; Joannes Bros. Co. v. Lamborn (1923) 237 N. Y. 207, 142
N. E. 587. There is also a good discussion in Siefkin v. Erie R. R. (1908,
Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 57 Misc. 222, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1060; Seiter v'. Bischoff
(1895) 63 Mo. App. 157; Rinard v. 0. K. C. & E. R. R. (1901) 164 Mo.
270, 64 S. W. 124; Astin v. Chicago etc. R. R. (1910) 143 Wis. 477, 128 N.
W. 265; (1911) 31 L. R. A. (N. s.) 158, note.
20 See COMMENTS (1921) 1 OR. L. Rsv. 26; (1922) 10 CALIF. L. REV. 251;
(1917) 1 MINN. L. REv. 94. As showing the liberal development, of.
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plaintiff may make alternative claims against different defend-
ants. The effect of the court's logic would be to wipe out of the
statute the provision permitting the suing of defendants alterna-
tively responsible.2' By this strict construction the new statue
does not amend the old; quite the contrary.
It would seem, therefore, that the plaintiff has shown a proper
case for the application of the new provisions as to joining de-
fendants.22 True, it would have been more artistic for him to
have told his story in numbered paragraphs in a single count and
asked the court specifically to determine the responsibility of each
defendant.2 This would have indicated more directly his reliance
on these statutes. Yet in view of the confusion of the New
York cases on this matter of the use of separate counts, he ought
not t be criticised on the score of form alone. -  The main point
is that there is no possible doubt of his position, and a rewriting
of the complaint could not the more clearly inform the court and
counsel that he wishes to hold one or both of the two defendants
for the child's death. The case should not even have been re-
versed for the correction of the pleading, much less for the drop-
ping of one of the defendants.
Had the court contented itself with holding the joinder incon-
venient on the facts, comparatively little harn would have been
done. But the wording and tone of the opinion must necessarily
Derby v. Gallup (1860) 5 Blinn. 119, with McAlpinc v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. (1916) 134 Blinn. 192, 158 N. W. 967. For the early confusion in New
York, see the cases cited in Derby v. Gallup; the liberal rule has long pre-
vailed, Bruce v. Burr (1876) 67 N. Y. 237.
2 See svpra note 6. The court has apparently recognized joinder in
the alternative in Zenith Bathing Pavilion, Inc. v. Fair Oaks S. S. Corp.
(1925) 240 N. Y. 307, 148 N. E. 532, citing some of the lower court de-
cisions.
22 Sherlock v. Manwaren, supra note 2 (several doctors who successively
set the plaintiff's arm, may be joined in an action for damages; this
excellent decision would, it seems, not be sustainable under the instant
case) ; Cowles v. Eidlitz & Son, Inc. (1923, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 121 Misc.
340, 201 N. Y. Supp. 254; NOTEs (1924) 24 CoL. L. Rsv. 203; Bullock
v. L. G. 0. Co. [1907, C. A.] 1 K. B. 361 and Berlcmann v. Brtih Motor Cab
Co., Ltd., [1914, C. A.] 3 K. B. 181 (collision cases to determine which
defendant is responsible); Compania Sansinena -e. Houldcr Bros. [1910]
2 K. B. 354; Re Beck; Attia. v. Seed (1918, C. A.) 118 L. T. 629; Payne v.
British Time Recorder Co., supra. note 11; Eng. Ann. Prac., 1924, 0. 16, r. 4,
7, and notes, pp. 224-229, 230, 231; (1907) 51 SoL. JoUR. 275; cf. Davic
v. Groner (1923, N. J.) 121 Atl. 446.
23 The confusion is discussed in Clark, loc. cit. supra note 2. See also
supra, note 15. For example, in the case of Heapby v. Eidlitz (1921, 1st
Dept.) 197 App. Div. 455, 189 N. Y. Supp. 431, the plaintiff made alter-
native allegations against the defendant-a practice permissible under the
more liberal codes, (1924) 34 YALE LAW JoTRNAL, 103; and the court per
Page, J., reached the surprising result that there were two causes of
action stated which were inconsistent and that therefore they iniest bo
separately stated.
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have the most baleful effect upon the lower New York courts,
most of whom, unfortunately, needed no spur towards pleading
legalism.2- The harm of such a decision is not limited to the par-
ticular case; it will continue long after this litigation, now so un-
necessarily to be lengthened, has at length been ended. It will
continue in fact until it is either overruled by the court or legisla-
ture; for that, it is confidently predicted, will be its fate.
C. E. C.
CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN OWNERS OF WRONGFULLY PLEDGED
SECURITIES
The cases occasionally present the situation where contribu-
tion is exacted from persons subjected to a common burden from
which they are freed at the expense of others in the same posi-
tion; and with the increasing complexity of commercial organi-
zation its frequent recurrence may be expected. In the recent
New York Case of Asylum of St. Vincent de Paul v. McGuire
(1925) 239 N. Y. 375, 146 N. E. 632, several people deposited
with a broker negotiable securities for safe-keeping. After
wrongfully, pledging them with a bank for a loan, the broker
became bankrupt and the bank liquidated sufficient securities to
recover its loan, the securities of a few, however, remaining in-
tact. Reversing the trial judge, the court held that the remain-
ing securities should be sold and a pro rata division of the pro-
ceeds be made among all the depositors.
In the few cases involving this same factual situation the
courts have adopted two distinct views: first, that securities sur-
viving the bank's claim may be recovered in full by their origi-
nal owners without contribution ;2 and, second, that the remaining
securities shall be subject to such contribution as will effect a
pro rata distribution of the loss. The instant case represents
the application of the second view, and is in accord with the
24 Professor Rothschild, the successful counsel in the instant case, has
suggested that it is pressure of business which leads to the illiberal atti-
tude on the part of the lower New York courts. (1925) 25 COL. L. REV.
30, 41. It may be that the courts do hope to lighten their labors by dis-
posing of the cases before them on short and narrow pleading grounds;
but in the long run this can only serve to increase the congestion. Pres-
sure of business ought to lead to less, rather than more, insistence on
pleading technicalities.
,- I For the duty owed by a broker to his principal, see (1925) 34 YAx=
LAw JoURNAL, 449.
2In re McIntyre (1910, C. C. A. 2d) 181 Fed. 955; In ro McIntyre
(1911, C. C. A. 2d) 189 Fed. 46; Johnson v. Bixby (1918, C. C. A. 8th)
252 Fed. 103.
a Gould v. Central Trust Co. (1879, Sup. Ct. Spec. T., N. Y.) 6 Abb,
N. C. 381; McBride v. Potter-Lovell Co. (1897) 169 Mass. 7, 47 N. E.
